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After a sharp increase from the mid 1970s onwards, the unemployment rate has uc-
tuated around a persistent high level ever since the mid 1980s in many OECD countries.
As this is at odds with traditional theories of a constant natural rate of unemployment,
as pioneered by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), dominant alternative descriptions
nowadays are hysteresis theories, which model extreme persistence in unemployment, and
structuralist theories, which describe uctuations in unemployment as both movements
around and shifts of the natural rate. In these models, permanent shifts in the natural
rate are driven by institutional changes and their interaction with macroeconomic shocks
(see e.g. Nickell et al., 2005; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Blanchard, 2006). One insti-
tutional factor that gained particular attention is labour taxes. The eective tax rate on
employed labour in the EU15 (i.e. the 15 member countries of the European Union since
1995), calculated as the ratio of social security contributions and personal income taxes
to total gross wages, has increased from 28.6% in 1970 to a maximum of 40.1% in 1996
(Martinez-Mongay, 2000, table BI.6.). As the EU15 unemployment rate rose sharply over
more or less the same period, it is a widespread belief, especially among policy makers,
that the increase in labour taxes is one of the prime factors responsible for the increase
in unemployment. Not surprisingly, the alleviation of the high tax burden on labour has
been declared to be one of the prime instruments to ght high unemployment.
The question whether cutting labour taxes is the answer to Europe's unemployment
problem has also been at the forefront of academic discussion. Yet, extensive empirical
research has not succeeded in providing robust evidence conrming the alleged positive
relation between taxes and unemployment. Surveying the literature, the estimated elas-
ticity of unemployment with respect to taxes ranges from zero (Bean et al., 1986; Layard
et al., 2005; Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) over medium-sized (Elmeskov
et al., 1998; Nickell and Layard, 1999; Nickell et al., 2005; Planas et al., 2007) up to
large (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). In our opinion, the reason for these conicting results
is threefold. First, standard labour market theories suggest that the impact of taxes on
unemployment depends on labour market institutions. Cross-country variation in these
institutions implies cross-country variation in the unemployment incidence of taxes. Dav-
2eri and Tabellini (2000) indeed nd the largest tax incidence for countries with labour
market institutions which are identied as being unfavourable. Second, the major part of
the recent literature estimates tax elasticities using panel data. As both unemployment
and labour taxes are potentially non-stationary, the observed strong long-run correla-
tion may be due to the fact that these series exhibit a similar, but independent, upward
trend. Although the possibility of a spurious regressions problem is acknowledged in the
literature, most studies do not formally test for cointegration. One exception is Berger
and Everaert (2009) who show that unemployment rates do not cointegrate with labour
market institutions in the panel of OECD countries studied by Nickell et al. (2005).
Third, as emphasised by Daveri (2003), the empirical results in the literature potentially
suer from an important missing variables problem. This problem arises because theory
suggests a variety of variables aecting structural unemployment but some of them are
dicult to measure or even unobservable, e.g. the reservation wage which is a function of,
among others, the value of leisure. If these omitted variables are correlated with the tax
rate, their explanatory power gets misattributed to those explanatory variables that are
included in the model. Even more problematic, one obtains spurious regression results if
the omitted variables are non-stationary. The nding in Berger and Everaert (2009), for
instance, that unemployment does not cointegrate with a large set of labour market insti-
tutions might be caused by omitted non-stationary variables and, as such, does not imply
that there is no long-run relation between unemployment and labour market institutions.
To the best of our knowledge, Planas et al. (2007) is the only empirical paper on this
subject to account for the missing variables problem. They estimate the impact of labour
taxes on unemployment within an unobserved component (UC) model in which the equi-
librium rate of unemployment is made up of a non-stationary unobservable component
capturing non-measurable factors plus an observed component that represents the eect
of labour taxes. This modelling of the equilibrium rate as a non-stationary process is in
line with both hysteresis and structuralist theories as it allows for permanent shifts in
unemployment induced by either transitory shocks having permanent eects on the level
of unemployment or permanent institutional changes that shift the equilibrium level of
unemployment. Using euro area aggregate yearly data over the period 1970-2004, the
unemployment tax elasticity in Planas et al. is 0.30 but not signicantly dierent from
3zero at the 5% level. A possible reason for the large standard error is the use of euro area
aggregates which implies that only 35 observations are available.
This paper estimates a reduced form unemployment equation to analyse the impact
of labour taxes on unemployment using a panel of yearly observations over the period
1970-2005 for 16 OECD countries. Panel data unit root and cointegration tests show
that unemployment and labour tax rates are non-stationary but not cointegrated. As
this nding may be induced by missing non-stationary variables we set up a panel UC
model similar to Planas et al. (2007). The main dierence is that instead of aggregating
the data we add a cross-sectional dimension by pooling countries. This enrichment of
the dataset has two important advantages. First, the larger sample size may consider-
ably improve estimation accuracy, which is of much practical interest as Planas et al.
obtained a fairly large standard error resulting in a 90% condence interval for the tax
elasticity that covers the range [0.02,0.54]. Second, by pooling countries according to
their wage-setting institutions we are able to identify possible heterogeneity of the tax
impact on unemployment. Note that in contrast to the euro area aggregates of Planas
et al., our dataset is also richer in terms of the number of countries and labour market
characteristics of the countries included, i.e. in addition to the countries in the euro area
(except Luxemburg) it also includes Denmark, Sweden, Japan, the UK and the US. So
besides allowing to identify heterogeneity, there is also a greater need to model it in our
dataset. In line with Daveri and Tabellini, we have opted to group countries with sim-
ilar wage-setting institutions instead of estimating the model country by country. The
main reason for this is that we want to keep the advantage of improved eciency of
parameter estimators from having a panel dataset. Labour taxes are found to have a
highly signicant positive impact on unemployment in countries characterised by strong
but decentralised unions and thus our estimates conrm the ndings in Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000). In countries with competitive labour
markets or with a high degree of centralisation in wage bargaining, labour taxes have no
impact on unemployment.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briey review the literature on
the relation between labour taxes and equilibrium unemployment. Section 3 includes
the empirical specication and presents panel data unit root and cointegration tests to
4motivate our UC approach of modelling the equilibrium rate of unemployment as a partly
unobserved non-stationary process. Section 4 introduces taxes and unemployment in a
panel UC model and presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Labour taxes and equilibrium unemployment
In structuralist theories of unemployment, as initiated by Phelps (1994), the equi-
librium rate of unemployment is driven by institutional changes in the economy and
their interaction with macroeconomic shocks (see e.g. Nickell et al., 2005; Blanchard and
Wolfers, 2000; Blanchard, 2006). One institutional factor that gained particular attention
is labour taxes. Taxation aects equilibrium unemployment through its impact on both
labour demand and supply.
On the demand side, the employment incidence of an increase in labour taxes de-
pends on the proportion of the tax burden that is borne by the employer. This shifting
forward onto the employer's labour costs reects the degree to which employees can suc-
cessfully oppose to a reduction in their consumption wage induced by a tax increase.
Standard bargaining models suggest a large variety of factors that determine the de-
gree of tax shifting and consequently the employment incidence of taxes (see e.g. Layard
et al., 2005). A crucial determinant is the tax treatment of alternative income sources for
workers, e.g. unemployment benets (Pissarides, 1998; Nickell and Layard, 1999; Daveri
and Tabellini, 2000). These alternative income sources represent the fall-back position of
workers. If these are indexed to the net wage, the fall-back position, and consequently
the bargaining strength of the union, deteriorates proportional to the tax increase. In
this case, the burden of the tax is borne entirely by the employees in terms of lower
consumption wages. As labour taxes do not aect labour costs they induce no employ-
ment incidence (this is referred to as labour tax neutrality). Unions may only eectively
resist a long-run fall in net wages if alternative income sources are not equally aected
by the increase in taxes. In this case, labour taxes have a negative eect on employment
as they drive a wedge between labour income and alternative income. The extent of this
negative eect depends on (i) the amount of product market competition, (ii) the amount
of labour market competition, and (iii) the degree of centralisation or co-ordination of
the wage bargaining system. First, the stronger the competition on the product mar-
5ket, i.e. the more elastic labour demand, the less the employer is willing/able to accept
higher product wages and therefore the less scope for forward shifting of labour taxes.
Second, the degree of tax shifting is negatively related to the amount of labour mar-
ket competition. Low competition on the labour market, i.e. the wage-setting schedule
is atter or more elastic, corresponds to unions being more concerned with preserving
wages and less concerned with employment. This implies a higher proportion of taxes
being shifted forward to labour costs. Excessive labour market regulations (e.g. extensive
employment protection and high minimum wages), a high union bargaining power and
insider-behaviour of employed workers all hinder the competition on the labour market
and therefore increase the employment incidence of taxes. Third, the degree of centralisa-
tion of wage bargaining and/or the degree of co-ordination by rms and employers across
rms may also be a crucial factor explaining the amount of tax-shifting. Calmfors and
Drill (1988) have argued that in both highly centralised/co-ordinated wage bargaining
systems and in fully decentralised/competitive systems, unions are likely to take a more
moderate stand in response to adverse shocks, e.g. a tax increase, hitting the economy.
In addition to the employment incidence of labour taxes, equilibrium unemployment
is also aected by the impact of labour taxes on the supply of labour. Higher taxes may
(i) reduce labour supply as the opportunity costs of leisure decline (substitution eect)
and (ii) increase labour supply as the disposable income of households declines (income
eect). Theory is generally inconclusive in determining which eect dominates.
3. Empirical specication and data
The previous section suggests ample reasons for why there may not be a clear-cut
relation between labour taxes and equilibrium unemployment. This inability of theory to
provide an unconditional answer implies that the analysis of the unemployment incidence
of labour taxes is essentially an empirical matter. In this section, we suggest a reduced
form equation in which equilibrium unemployment is made up of an observed component
related to labour taxes and an unobserved component related to other factors. Possible
heterogeneity of the impact of labour taxes is modelled by grouping countries according
to their wage-setting institutions. We further look at the time series properties of our
data and show that unemployment rates and labour tax rates are non-stationary but
6not cointegrated variables. This implies that regressing unemployment on taxes yields
spurious results. These ndings motivate the use of an unobserved component model,
as outlined in the next section, with equilibrium unemployment modelled as a non-
stationary process.
3.1. Empirical specication
Let the equilibrium rate of unemployment, u
it be given by
u
it = it + uNR
it ; i = 1;:::;N; t = 1;:::;T; (1)
where N is the number of countries, T is the number of time series observations, it is the
labour tax rate and uNR
it is a factor that captures all other shifters of labour supply (e.g.
the benet replacement rate, benet duration, ...) and labour demand (e.g. productivity
growth, employment protection, ...). Letting uC
it denote short-run uctuations around the
equilibrium rate, actual unemployment uit can be written as
uit = it + uNR
it + uC
it: (2)
This empirical specication is standard in the literature (see e.g. Nickell et al., 2005;
Daveri and Tabellini, 2000; Planas et al., 2007). 1 The goal of this paper is to estimate
, which measures the impact of labour taxes on unemployment. As a robustness check,
we will also estimate the relation between labour taxes and employment.
3.2. Data and country grouping
Our dataset consists of yearly observations for 16 OECD countries over the period
1970-2005. The unemployment rate is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook. As a
measure of labour taxes we use the eective tax rates on employed labour from Martinez-
Mongay (2003). 2 This tax rate has been calculated with the so-called Mendoza-Razin-
1 Note that Planas et al. use a simultaneous-equation model adding a Phillips curve to the reduced
form unemployment equation. The information on wage ination, wage share and labour productivity
supplied by their Phillips curve adds accuracy to the trend-cycle decomposition of unemployment (see
also Planas et al., 2007, p. 1364) but not to the impact of labour taxes on unemployment. As we only
want to estimate the impact of taxes, we do not consider a Phillips curve.
2 We would like to thank Carlos Martinez-Mongay for providing an update of this dataset.
7Tezar approach (see Mendoza et al., 1994) using the EU AMECO database. It is dened
as the ratio of labour tax revenue, including social contributions, to the taxable base.
Tax indicators based on this approach have been used in the vast majority of empirical
studies on the relation between unemployment and taxes (e.g. Planas et al., 2007; Daveri
and Tabellini, 2000).
The standard wage bargaining models outlined above suggest that the unemployment
incidence of labour taxes depends on prevailing wage-setting institutions, i.e.  is poten-
tially heterogeneous over countries. Instead of estimating a fully heterogeneous panel, we
pool countries with similar wage-setting institutions. The main reason for this is that we
want to keep the advantage of improved eciency of parameter estimators from having a
panel dataset. Following Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Domenech and Garcia (2008),
and using the same notation, we classify countries in three dierent groups. The rst
group (NORDIC) includes Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. These countries are
characterised by strong unions, wage bargaining at a central level and/or a high degree
of co-ordination. The unemployment incidence of labour taxes is expected to be moder-
ate in these countries. The second group (EUCON) includes Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Greece. In these countries, wages are gen-
erally bargained at the intermediate level without a strong tendency for co-ordination
across bargaining units. In this setting, unions are expected to use their bargaining power
to shift the burden of labour taxes onto employers. The third group (ANGLO) includes
Japan, Ireland, the US and the UK. In these countries unions are not strong enough to
shift the tax burden. Moreover, the sharp trade-o between wage increases and employ-
ment faced by the rm-based unions moderates wage claims. In section 4.3 we shall test
how sensitive our results are to a modication of the country grouping.
3.3. Time series properties of the data
In this section we look at the time series properties of unemployment and labour tax
rates, i.e. we check for unit roots and cointegration. At this stage, variables aecting
uNR
it and uC
it are ignored. The main reason is that especially uNR
it is hard to capture, i.e.
there are many labour market institutions which potentially aect unemployment, most
of them being dicult to measure. In section 4 we will therefore treat uNR
it and uC
it as
8Table 1
Unit root and cointegration tests
MW-ADF tests Cointegration analysis
unemployment labour taxes PDOLS MW-EG tests
ANGLO 9.04 [0.33] 14.92 [0.06] 0.47 (0.17) 8.32 [0.40]
EUCON 21.47 [0.20] 18.36 [0.24] 0.46 (0.11) 20.07 [0.23]
NORDIC 6.01 [0.63] 9.87 [0.29] 0.33 (0.12) 12.60 [0.15]
The MW-ADF and the MW-EG test statistics combine, using equation (3),
the country-specic ADF and EG statistics respectively. P-values are reported
in square brackets. Standard errors, written in parentheses, are computed
using the pre-whitening method suggested by Andrews and Monahan (1992).
being unobserved but include them in the analysis using an UC model.
We rst test for a unit root using the Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW-ADF) panel unit
root test. This test combines the p-values, denoted pi, from country-specic Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests as
PMW =  2
N X
i=1
logpi; i = 1;:::;N: (3)
PMW has a 2
2N distribution if the underlying country-specic tests are independent.
As both unemployment and labour tax rates are highly correlated over countries 3 , this
assumption is clearly not satised. Therefore, we simulate the distribution of PMW using
a bootstrap procedure (see Berger and Everaert, 2009, for technical details). Table 1
reports the panel results. The null hypothesis of a unit root in unemployment and labour
taxes cannot be rejected (at the 5% level of signicance) for any of the three country
groups.
Given the non-stationarity of the data, we check for cointegration between unem-
ployment and labour taxes using an Engle-Granger (EG) procedure. First, the long-run
relation between unemployment and labour taxes is estimated using the panel dynamic
ordinary least squares (PDOLS) estimator suggested by Mark and Sul (2003). Second,
we check for cointegration using country-specic EG tests, i.e. ADF tests on the country-
specic residuals, and combine these EG tests in a MW-EG panel cointegration test using
equation (3). The distribution of this test is again simulated using a bootstrap procedure
3 The cross-country correlation ranges from -0.42 to 0.97 for the unemployment rate and from -0.17 to
0.99 for labour taxes.
9(see Berger and Everaert, 2009, for technical details). The results are reported in Table
1. The impact of labour taxes is estimated to be fairly high in each of the three country
groups but the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected at conventional
signicance levels. Note that the result of no cointegration is what one should expect
from theory as nding cointegration would imply that labour taxes are the only driving
force of unemployment in the long run, i.e. all other factors such as changes in the benet
system or employment protection legislation would only have transitory eects on the
unemployment rate.
4. An unobserved component approach
In this section, we estimate equation (2) taking into account other factors, in addition
to labour taxes, that aect unemployment. Unlike other studies, we do not attempt to
include all variables aecting equilibrium and temporary unemployment but treat uNR
it
and uC
it as unobservable and model them using an UC model. The main reason for this is
that there are many factors which potentially aect unemployment, most of them being
hard to measure or even unobservable. As a robustness check, we will add data on six
observed labour market institutions in section 4.3.5.
4.1. Model and state space representation
Equation (1) models equilibrium unemployment as being composed of a labour tax
eect and an unobserved component uNR
it . As unemployment and labour taxes are shown
not to be cointegrated, uNR
it should be non-stationary. 4 Therefore, we model it as
uNR
it+1 = (1 + )uNR
it   uNR
it 1 + NR
it ; (4)
where NR
it is a Gaussian mean zero white noise error term. As a pure random walk
process would result in a non-smooth series that is hard to reconcile with the expected
4 Since the unemployment rate is bounded between zero and unity one would expect it to be stationary.
Over long periods of time this indeed seems to be the case. Using postwar data though, it shows a clear
upward trend and strong persistence resulting in the non-stationary behaviour as documented by the unit
root tests. This small sample behaviour requires the equilibrium rate to be modelled as a non-stationary
process. Note that this is in line with the current practice in the literature (see e.g. Apel and Jansson,
1999a,b; Fabiani and Mestre, 2004).
10smooth evolution of the structural characteristics driving equilibrium unemployment, the
AR(2) specication in equation (4) allows for a smooth evolution of uNR
it over time, i.e.
the closer  to one the smoother uNR
it . If  = 0, uNR
it is a pure random walk process. Note
that in order to induce smoothness, the equilibrium rate of unemployment is nowadays
often modelled as an I(2) series, i.e.  is set to one (see e.g. Orlandi and Pichelmann,
2000). We do not restrict  to be equal to one in equation (4) as in this case uNR
it exhibits
a (time-varying) drift, which would be hard to justify from an economic perspective. The
short-run deviation of unemployment from its equilibrium rate, which could be labelled
cyclical unemployment, is assumed to be an AR(2) process
uc
it+1 = 1uc
it + 2uc
it 1 + C
it; (5)
where C
it is a Gaussian mean zero white noise error term. The AR(2) specication allows
cyclical unemployment to exhibit the standard hump-shaped pattern.
The model in equations (2), (4) and (5) can be written in a panel linear Gaussian state
space representation of the the following form
ut =  t + Zt; (6)
t+1 = St + Rt; t  N(0;Q); t = 1;:::;T: (7)
The observation equation (6) models the vector of observed unemployment rates ut =
[u1t;:::;uNt]
0 as a function of a vector of observed labour tax rates t = [1t;:::;Nt]
0
and a vector of unobserved states t, which includes uNR
t =

uNR
1t ;:::;uNR
Nt
0
and uC
t =

uC
1t;:::;uC
Nt
0
. The latter are modelled in the state equation (7).  , Z, S and R are matri-
ces including the parameters ;;1 and 2. These parameters are assumed to be homoge-
neous within each of the three considered country groups. t =

C
1t;:::;C
Nt;NR
1t ;:::;NR
Nt
0
is a vector of independent Gaussian disturbances with covariance matrix Q. We assume
that the innovations in t are mutually independent with variances that are heterogeneous
over countries.
4.2. Estimation results
The likelihood for the linear Gaussian state space model in (6)-(7) can be calculated
by a routine application of the Kalman lter and maximised with respect to the unknown
11parameters using an iterative numerical procedure (see e.g. Harvey, 1989; Durbin and
Koopman, 2001). 5 The stationary state variables uC
it are initialised by drawing from
their stationary distributions while a diuse initialisation is used for the non-stationary
state variables uNR
it . Standard errors for the estimates are calculated by inverting the
Hessian matrix. This standard method of inference has recently been shown to be valid
even in models with integrated series such as the one used here (see Chang et al., 2009).
Table 2
UC model estimates (1970-2005)
ANGLO EUCON NORDIC
 -0.05 (0.06) 0.15 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04)
1 0.99 (0.20) 1.35 (0.06) 1.51 (0.10)
2 -0.47 (0.12) -0.64 (0.05) -0.74 (0.09)
 0.66 (0.23) 0.80 (0.11) 0.41 (0.11)
LMAR 0.02 [0.88] 0.05 [0.82] 0.12 [0.73]
LMMA 0.15 [0.56] 0.23 [0.59] 0.35 [0.64]
The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Labour
taxes are measured by the eective tax rate on employed
labour. Standard errors are in parentheses. LMAR and LMMA
are LM tests for an AR respectively MA structure in the resid-
uals. P-values are in brackets.
Table 2 presents the reduced form estimation results. 6 The estimates for 1 and 2
imply that the properties of the cyclical component are in line with previous empirical
studies, i.e. a hump-shaped response to shocks and a cycle periodicity of about 10 years.
The estimates for  imply that the trend component is smoother than a simple random
walk, especially for the ANGLO and the EUCON group. Consistent with existing em-
pirical evidence (e.g. Daveri and Tabellini, 2000) we nd a signicant positive impact of
labour taxes only for the EUCON group and not for ANGLO and NORDIC. This suggest
that only in the EUCON countries unions have successfully resisted the downward pres-
sure of higher taxes on net wages. This is expected from theory (e.g. Pissarides, 1998)
as in these countries wages are generally bargained at the intermediate level without a
strong tendency for co-ordination across bargaining units. For the EUCON countries the
5 The GAUSS code to obtain the results presented in this section is available from the authors on
request.
6 Note that these reduced form estimates do not allow us to say something about underlying structural
parameters.
12tax elasticity is estimated to be 0.15 with a standard error of 0.04. It is worth highlighting
that this lies in the interval of Planas et al. (2007) but the point estimate is considerably
lower and, more important, it is estimated with a fairly low degree of uncertainty. 7 This
shows that using panel data has an important advantage in terms of estimation accuracy.
The latter point is conrmed when we allow for country-specic tax elasticity (shown in
Table A.1 in Appendix A). The average tax elasticity for the EUCON countries is 0.17
and the average standard error is 0.12. This shows that pooling countries reduces the
parameter uncertainty, as measured by the standard error, considerably.
In the state space model presented in equations (6)-(7) the residuals are assumed to
be white noise. Following Durbin and Koopman (2001) we check whether this property
holds by testing for autocorrelation in the standardised one-step ahead prediction errors
of the state space model. We use two LM tests suggested by Baltagi and Li (1995). The
rst test species the residuals as an AR(1) process, i.e. vit = vit 1 + "it, and tests the
null hypothesis that  = 0. The second test models the residuals as a MA(1) process,
i.e. vit = "it + "it 1, and test the null hypothesis that  = 0. Both tests show that
we cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation in any of the three country groups (see
bottom Table 2).
4.3. Robustness checks
4.3.1. Cross-sectional dependencies and homogeneity of unemployment dynamics
The model in equations (2), (4) and (5) assumes that in addition to the tax elasticity
also the dynamics of cyclical unemployment and the smoothness of equilibrium unem-
ployment are homogeneous within the groups. Moreover, it assumes shocks to cyclical
and equilibrium unemployment to be cross-sectionally independent. This seems partic-
ularly questionable for shocks to cyclical unemployment as they reect business cycle
movements and thus are potentially correlated over countries. Therefore we estimate
the model by allowing for (i) country-specic autoregressive parameters 1 and 2, (ii)
country-specic dynamics of equilibrium unemployment, , and (iii) non-zero covariances
between shocks to cyclical unemployment. The results are presented in Table B.1 in the
7 The standard error on the tax coecient obtained by Planas et al. is 0.17.
13Appendix. For all three country groups the estimated tax elasticity remains virtually un-
aected. Also the sum of the autoregressive parameters in cyclical unemployment does
not vary substantially across countries. In contrast, the estimates of  are found to be
quite heterogeneous even within the same group. The estimated covariances between
shocks to cyclical unemployment are, as expected, positive for the vast majority of coun-
tries in all three groups. However, the fairly large number of parameters to be estimated
in this model makes the numerical optimisation of the sample log-likelihood function
quite tedious. As the results show that the estimate of the tax elasticity is not aected
by the parameter restriction imposed in the baseline model, we will proceed with this
baseline model in the subsequent robustness checks.
4.3.2. Alternative country grouping
In the country grouping outlined in section 3.2 we pool countries with similar wage-
setting institutions. An implicit assumption is that these institutions did not change over
the considered period. This seems questionable as we cover a period of 35 years. In fact a
recent study, OECD (2004), shows that particularly Sweden, Denmark and Ireland have
experienced substantial changes in their wage-setting institutions. In this section, we re-
group countries taking into account changes in wage-setting institutions. According to
the OECD, Sweden and Denmark have become much less centralised/coordinated since
the second half of the 1980s. Contrary, Ireland has moved to a more centralised and
coordinated wage bargaining system since the 1990s. Therefore, Denmark and Sweden
are classied in the EUCON group from 1985 onwards and Ireland in the NORDIC group
from 1990 onwards. The results of the UC model with this alternative country grouping
are shown in Table 3. Two minor changes can be emphasised. First the point estimate
of  for the EUCON groups drops from 0.15 to 0.13 and the standard error for the
NORDIC group has become smaller implying a small but signicant impact of labour
taxes on unemployment.
Domenech and Garcia (2008, p.7) mention the need to include Spain to get a signicant
positive tax impact in the country group EUCON. This result cannot be conrmed here.
When Spain is omitted, the estimated tax elasticity for the EUCON countries is 0.16
(0.05). Generally, we nd that the reported results are not very sensitive to the omission
14Table 3
Alternative country grouping
ANGLO EUCON NORDIC
 -0.05 (0.06) 0.13 (0.04) 0.07 (0.03)
1 1.00 (0.17) 1.39 (0.07) 1.19 (0.13)
2 -0.50 (0.12) -0.68 (0.06) -0.65 (0.09)
 0.67 (0.20) 0.63 (0.12) 0.70 (0.13)
LMAR 0.06[0.82] 0.04 [0.84] 0.15 [0.70]
LMMA 0.23 [0.59] 0.20 [0.58] 0.38 [0.65]
The dependent variable is the unemployment rate.
Labour taxes are measured by the eective tax rate on
employed labour. Standard errors are in parentheses.
LMAR and LMMA are LM tests for an AR respec-
tively MA structure in the residuals. P-values are in
brackets.
of individual countries. 8
4.3.3. Endogeneity of labour taxes
Eective labour tax rates are potentially endogenous as they are not statutory rates
but calculated as the ratio of the labour tax revenue to the taxable base, which are both
aected by unemployment. Therefore, we check the robustness of our results by using
the tax wedge taken from the OECD Taxing Wages database as an alternative measure
for labour taxes. It is dened as the dierence between labour costs to the employer
and the after-tax pay of the employee relative to the employer's labour costs. The main
advantage is that its calculation is based on micro-simulation of national tax legislation.
This is done for two socio-economic groups: (i) a single person without children and (ii)
a one-earner married couple with two children. Unfortunately the data only range over
the period 1979-2004, where for the rst 10 years data had to be interpolated as only
one observation every two years is available. By starting in 1979 we miss the period
in which unemployment started increasing sharply in many OECD countries. This is
the main reason why we base our main analysis on the eective tax rate and use the
tax wedge as a robustness check. Table 4 presents the results. Using data for the socio-
economic group \single", the results from Table 2 are conrmed, i.e. the estimated tax
8 Note that this holds to a lesser extend for the ANGLO and NORDIC countries as these groups consist
of fewer countries.
15impact is only signicant in the EUCON group with a point estimate of 0.14. For the
\one-earner married couple" group none of the estimated tax eects is signicant at the
95% level. For the country groups EUCON and NORDIC the tax elasticity is 0.06 and
0.08 respectively and signicant at the 90% level. An second source of endogeneity is
Table 4
OECD tax wedge data (1979-2004)
Single Married, two children
ANGLO EUCON NORDIC ANGLO EUCON NORDIC
 0.02 (0.02) 0.14 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 0.02 (0.02) 0.06 (0.04) 0.08 (0.05)
1 1.35 (0.12) 1.44 (0.07) 1.47 (0.09) 1.36 (0.12) 1.47 (0.07) 1.47 (0.09)
2 -0.71 (0.12) -0.81 (0.07) -0.67 (0.08) -0.71 (0.11) -0.81 (0.07) -0.67 (0.07)
 0.48 (0.13) 0.52 (0.11) 0.46 (0.16) 0.48 (0.13) 0.49 (0.13) 0.43 (0.16)
LMAR 0.02 [0.87] 0.08 [0.78] 0.08 [0.78] 0.04 [0.84] 0.08 [0.77] 0.07 [0.79]
LMMA 0.16 [0.56] 0.28 [0.61] 0.28 [0.61] 0.20 [0.58] 0.28 [0.61] 0.27 [0.61]
The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Labour taxes are measured by the OECD tax
wedge. Standard errors are in parentheses. LMAR and LMMA are LM tests for an AR respectively
MA structure in the residuals. P-values are in brackets.
that governments can increase taxes in response to high unemployment. So even the
statutory tax wedge can be endogenous. We belief that this is not a very big problem,
though, as changing tax legislation typically takes a considerable amount of time. So
contemporaneous correlation is probably low. Moreover, nding good instruments for
statutory labour taxes is not straightforward.
4.3.4. Employment as labour market indicator
So far we only considered the impact of labour taxes on the rate of unemployment. This
assumes that unemployment is a good indicator of labour market performance. However,
as pointed out by e.g. Blanchard (2006), there might be shocks which aect the state of
the labour market but leave the rate of unemployment unaected. An increase in labour
taxes, for instance, lowers the incentive for people to join the labour force. This negative
eect does not translate into higher unemployment rates but leads to lower participation
and employment rates. Therefore, we consider the employment rate in hours 9 as an
9 The use of hours per employed person as a labour market indicator has recently been suggested by
Rogerson (2007) and Dhont and Heylen (2008). The latter paper also uses the employment rate in hours.
It is dened as the ratio of average hours worked per person of age 15 to 64 to the maximum possible
16alternative measure for the state of the labour market. Table 5 shows the results from
estimating the UC model with the employment rate in hours as the dependent variable
and the eective tax rate as a measure for labour taxes. The overall picture remains the
same. Only for the EUCON group a statistically signicant negative impact of labour
taxes on employment is found.
Table 5
Employment rate in hours (1970-2005)
ANGLO EUCON NORDIC
 0.08 (0.13) -0.11 (0.05) -0.03 (0.05)
1 1.01 (0.16) 0.87 (0.16) 1.40 (0.11)
2 -0.47 (0.08) 0.00 (0.12) -0.72 (0.08)
 0.84 (0.14) 0.76 (0.07) 0.45 (0.12)
LMAR 0.04 [0.83] 0.04 [0.84] 0.07 [0.79]
LMMA 0.21 [0.58] 0.19 [0.58] 0.27 [0.62]
The dependent variable is the employment rate in
hours. Labour taxes are measured by the eective tax
rate on employed labour. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. LMAR and LMMA are LM tests for an AR re-
spectively MA structure in the residuals. P-values are
in brackets.
4.3.5. Adding observed labour market institutions
So far we ignored other variables that may explain equilibrium unemployment. As
discussed earlier, economic theory relates unemployment to factors which are dicult to
measure or even unobservable. The UC model takes this into account by ltering out the
sum of all neglected variables aecting unemployment. However, there are certain labour
market institutions for which data are available. In this section we test whether the
estimates presented in Table 2 are robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables.
This may also be seen as testing for a possible omitted variables bias. In equation (2) 
measures the direct impact of taxes on unemployment assuming that taxes are orthogonal
to the omitted variables. However, if there are omitted variables that are correlated with
labour taxes  will capture this correlation. By adding labour market institution data
number of hours. It is calculated as the employment rate in persons times the ratio of average annual
hours per employed worker to 1920 (the maximum number of hours of a full-time worker, i.e. 48 weeks
times 40 working hours per week). Employment data are from the Groningen Growth and Development
Center, data on working age population are from the OECD.
17we attempt to control for this potential bias with respect to labour market institution
data. In particular we include six additional explanatory variables taken from Nickell
et al. (2005): employment protection (EP), union density (UD), benet replacement
ratio (BRR), benet duration (BD), wage bargaining coordination (BCO), and owner
occupation rate (OOR). It must be stressed that these labour market institution measures
are qualitative data and subjective indices. Thus they are likely to contain measurement
errors (see Daveri, 2003). With the exception of Greece, for which these data are not
reported, they are available until 1995. A natural question that arises when labour market
institution indicators are taken into consideration is whether they are cointegrated with
the rate of unemployment. From an economic perspective this might be plausible as
these institutions are believed to be responsible for the increase in unemployment in
many OECD countries since the 1970s. Thus we rst test for cointegration using the
approach described in section 3.3. The results show that the extended set of labour
market institutions is not cointegrated with unemployment. 10 This implies that there
are still other factors which explain structural unemployment and/or the institution
variables are indeed measured with error. 11 Table 6 shows the results of the UC model
with the institution data. The coecients for the institution variables are homogeneous
within country groups. The main conclusion is that the coecient on labour taxes is
left more or less unaected. The slight decrease is explained by the shorter time-span
rather than by the inclusion of the institutions variables, i.e. when the baseline model is
estimated until 1995 the tax elasticity is 0.12. Many of the institutions are statistically
insignicant and some even have the wrong sign. The imprecise estimate of the institution
variables might be attributed to the short time span 12 but also to the subjective and
qualitative nature of the data.
10The coecients for the institution variables in the cointegration test are homogeneous within country
groups. The p-values for the null of no cointegration are 0.52, 0.74 and 0.21 in the ANGLO, EUCON
and NORDIC group respectively.
11Berger and Everaert (2009) show that cointegration must also be rejected in the set-up of Nickell et al.
(2005) where additionally time dummies and interactions between institutions and various macroeco-
nomic shocks are allowed for.
12For most countries the dataset ranges from 1970 to 1995 but for some countries institution data are
only available from the mid 1970s. This further reduces the time-series dimension.
18Table 6
Institution variables (1970-1995)
ANGLO EUCON NORDIC
 0.01 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05) 0.00 (0.04)
1 1.23 (0.12) 1.30 (0.10) 1.21 (0.12)
2 -0.57 (0.12) -0.71 (0.08) -0.57 (0.09)
 0.23 (0.16) 0.79 (0.10) 0.96 (0.05)
BD 0.09 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01)
EP 0.25 (0.17) 0.04 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
RR -1.72 (1.71) -1.37 (1.69) -1.38 (2.79)
BCO -1.38 (1.49) 1.90 (2.07) -5.08 (2.29)
UDEN 0.06 (0.05) 0.10 (0.03) 0.17 (0.05)
OOR 0.11 (0.07) -0.08 (0.09) 0.06 (0.09)
LMAR 0.06 [0.81] 0.10 [0.75] 0.03 [0.85]
LMMA 0.24 [0.59] 0.31 [0.628] 0.19 [0.57]
The dependent variable is the unemployment rate.
Labour taxes are measured by the eective tax rate on
employed labour. Standard errors are in parentheses.
LMAR and LMMA are LM tests for an AR respec-
tively MA structure in the residuals. P-values are in
brackets.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a reduced form unemployment equation to quantify the
impact of labour taxes on unemployment for a panel of 16 OECD countries over the
period 1970-2005. In order to take into account possible cross-sectional heterogeneity we
group countries with similar labour market institutions: Anglo-Saxon countries, European
countries and Nordic countries. Using panel unit root and cointegration tests we nd that
both unemployment and labour taxes are non-stationary but not cointegrated. This is
not surprising as economic theory relates equilibrium unemployment to various factors.
Unfortunately some of these factors are unobserved, e.g. the reservation wage. Therefore,
we estimate the model using an unobserved component approach in which the missing
variable(s) are identied through the Kalman lter. The estimated impact of labour taxes
on unemployment is statistically signicant only for the European countries. The point
estimate of 0.15 indicates a rather moderate economic importance, though. Consistent
with standard bargaining models there is neither a signicant impact for Anglo-Saxon nor
19for Nordic countries. This suggests that reducing labour taxes to ght high unemployment
may be useful in countries with strong unions and a decentralised wage bargaining system,
but the eect should not be overestimated.
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20Appendix A. Country-specic tax elasticities
Table A.1
Country-specic tax elasticities
ANGLO EUCON NORDIC
Japan -0.05 (0.06) Belgium 0.25 (0.11) Italy 0.23 (0.05) Austria 0.07 (0.05)
UK 0.19 (0.14) France 0.46 (0.21) Netherlands 0.24 (0.08) Finland 0.10 (0.08)
US -0.53 (0.19) Germany -0.05 (0.12) Portugal 0.11 (0.11) Denmark -0.04 (0.09)
Ireland 0.58 (0.25) Greece -0.03 (0.09) Spain 0.11 (0.17) Sweden 0.02 (0.07)
Appendix B. Cross-sectional dependencies and country-specic dynamics
Table B.1
UC model with cross-sectional dependencies and country-specic dynamics
 1 2 
ANGLO -0.06 (0.05)
Japan 1.44 (0.15) -0.56 (0.15) 1.00 (0.00)
UK 1.31 (0.10) -0.62 (0.11) 0.85 (0.17)
US 0.91 (0.13) -0.21 (0.11) 0.00 (0.15)
Ireland 1.58 (0.13) -0.62 (0.13) 0.00 (0.00)
EUCON 0.14 (0.03)
Belgium 1.30 (0.09) -0.42 (0.08) 0.02 (1.37)
France 1.10 (0.13) -0.34 (0.12) 0.94 (0.06)
Germany 1.58 (0.11) -0.65 (0.13) 0.00 (0.00)
Greece 1.76 (0.08) -0.84 (0.07) 0.00 (0.00)
Italy 1.31 (0.15) -0.35 (0.14) 0.05 (2.84)
Netherlands 1.50 (0.08) -0.63 (0.08) 0.59 (0.20)
Portugal 1.42 (0.07) -0.61 (0.07) 0.09 (3.93)
Spain 1.51 (0.07) -0.92 (0.08) 0.73 (0.11)
NORDIC 0.04 (0.03)
Austria 1.19 (0.33) -0.45 (0.17) 0.90 (0.18)
Finland 1.48 (0.07) -0.74 (0.08) 0.90 (0.17)
Denmark 1.08 (0.15) -0.49 (0.15) 0.89 (0.14)
Sweden 1.55 (0.07) -0.79 (0.07) 0.12 (0.19)
The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Labour taxes are mea-
sured by the eective tax rate on employed labour. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
Variance-covariances matrix of shocks to cyclical unemployment:
21ANGLO Japan
UK
US
Ireland
Japan 0.0433
UK 0.0563 0.4645
US 0.0488 0.2784 0.6371
Ireland 0.0627 0.4005 0.6840 0.7643
NORDIC Austria
Finland
Denmark
Sweden
Austria 0.0642
Finland 0.0803 0.8710
Denmark 0.0670 0.3546 0.5267
Sweden 0.0557 0.3641 0.2236 0.1715
EUCON Belgium
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Belgium 0:3970
France 0:1956 0:2268
Germany 0:1841 0:1566 0:2948
Greece 0:1356 0:0113 0:0938 0:2459
Italy 0:1283 0:0818 -0.0426 -0.0412 0:3771
Netherlands 0:2907 0:0886 0:2777 0:1148 0:0688 0:4490
Portugal 0:1896 0:1156 0:0274 -0.1759 0:1473 0:1399 0:3951
Spain 0:0628 0:0382 0:0091 -0.0583 0:0483 0:0463 0:1309 0:0434
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